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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT S. NIELSON and ILA DEAN
NIELSON,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.
CENTRAL WATERWORKS COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, and the
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its Division of Water
Resources,

Case No. 17333

Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for a judgment declaring that the assets of a culinary water system, located in the unincorporated
town of Central, Utah, be administered in conformance with the
equal protection clauses of the Constitutions of the United
States and the State of Utah, and for damages stemming from
a denial of appellants' constitutional rights.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Central Waterworks Company and the State of Utah, by and
through its Division of water Resources, made separate motions
for summary judgment against the plaintiffs on July 23, 1980
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and August 8, 1980, respectively.

The motions for summary

judgment were heard by the District Court on August 20, 1980.
On August 26, 1980, the Court entered an order granting the
separate motions for summary judgment of the defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs request that the judgments entered below be
reversed and the matter remanded to the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Robert S. Nielson and Ila Dean Nielson are the owners
of a parcel of land, approximately 7.acres in size, which
is situated in the unincorporated town of Central, Utah.
(R. pp. 1-3, pl. comp.)

On or about September 15, 1975, the

Nielsons, desiring to subdivide the parcel into 18 home sites,
applied to Central Waterworks Company (hereinafter "Central")
for the water connections prerequisite to the planned subdivision.

( R. p.

2).

Central is a Utah non-profit corporation engaged in
the business of supplying water to its shareholders in and
around Central, Utah.

(R. pp. 1, 10, 36).

In 1952 and again

in 1973, Central entered into agreements with the State of
Utah, through its Department of Water Resources or predeces~r
agency, to construct a culinary water system.
2, 32, 36, 49, 50, 52).

(R. PP· 1,

Under those contracts, the State

financed all or most of the improvements and took title to
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all the physical assets,
of Central.

including water rights and easements,

Central was allowed to retain beneficial use

of the system under a repurchase (without interest) agreement.
(R. pp. 52-54).

Central denied the Nielsens' application, claiming that
its water supply was insufficient to service 18 additional
connections.

Investigation by the Nielsens, however, re-

vealed that Central's water supply was more than adequate.
A renewed application for the connections was denied by Central,
based on an alleged rule of the company that only one water
connection would be provided for each acre of property.

(R.

pp. 2, 3).
A further investigation by plaintiffs revealed that
Central, while purporting to operate under the "one connection one acre" rule, had in fact granted connections to applicants for five parcels of land haying acreages of .91,
.836, .83,

(R. p. 3).

.43, and .21 acres.

The Nielsens'

reapplication for water connections was again denied. (R.
p. 3).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
CENTRAL WATERWORKS' DENIAL OF CONNECTIONS
TO THE APPELLANTS CONSTITUTES STATE ACTION
Every cause of action emanating from a violation of a
person's right to equal protection under the law faces the
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threshhold requirement of "state action.•
XIV, Sl; Utah Const. art. I, S2.
one of classification:

U.S. Const. amend.

Essentially, the issue is

The acts complained of either consti-

tute state action or they don't.

Despite the cut and dried

appearance of the result, there is no litmus paper test for
the presence or absence of state action.

•only by sifting

facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance.•

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365

U.S. 715, 722, 6 L.Ed.2d 45, 50, 81 s.ct. 856 (1961).
A.

State Action Arises from the "Symbiotic
Relationship" Between the State and
Central Waterworks.

An inquiry into the presence of state action must begin
with an examination of the relationship between the State
and the private party.

The leading United States Supreme

Court case on this question, Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, supra, provides some insight in its delineation
of some of the factors which indicate state action.

In

Burton, the court found state action where a restaurant
located in a state-owned parking garage practiced racial
discrimination.
Initially, the court in Burton found it important that
the restaurant was an integral part of the state's plan to
provide financially self-sustaining parking garages.

The

Wilmington Parking Authority had leased space to a segre-

-4-
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gated restaurant as a means of financing its parking garage.
In short, the restaurant was seen as a tool of the Authority
for achieving its "essential governmental functions."

Id.

at 723, 6 L.Ed.2d at 51.
Similarly, the State of Utah, through its Department of
water Resources, has used Central Waterworks and others
similarly situated as an integral part of a statutory scheme
aimed at promoting efficient use of available water resources.
Utah Code Ann. §73-10-1,

et~·

(1953).

§73-10-1(3) esta-

blishes the policy "that water, as the property of the public,
should be so managed by the public that it can be put to
the highest use for public benefit."

Pursuant to this policy

and other provisions of the Act, the State financed the vast
majority of the two projects, taking legal title to the company's physical assets until such time as Central Waterworks
repurchased the projects.

It should also be noted that the

sums advanced by the State were subject to repayment without
interest.
State ownership of the assets of a private party has
been held to be a strong indication of the presence of state
action.

In Burton, state ownership of the parking garage

was cited by the court as one of the controlling factors.
Id. at 723, 6 L.Ed.2d at 51.

Furthermore, the court noted

that the parking authority could have required the restaurant, through its lease, "to discharge the responsibilities
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private
prise as a consequence of state participation.

ente~

But no state

may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them or failing to discharge them whatever the
may be."

Id. at 725, 6 L.Ed.2d at 52.

mot~e

In short, the State

of Utah has an affirmative obligation to insure that property
owned by the State is operated within the bounds of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In Holodnak v. Avco Corporation, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013, 46 L.Ed.2d 123, 96 S.Ct.
188 ( 1975), the discharge of an employee of a defense contractor for allegedly publishing an article critical of his employer was held to be state action.

The land upon which

Avco's plant was built, as well as the buildings and most
of the machinery, were owned by the United States.

In addi-

tion, both the government and Avco benefitted from the operation of the plant.

Under such circumstances, the Second

Circuit held that the employee's discharge was state action.
Many of the factors which the Second Circuit considered
important in Holodnak are present in the instant case.

For

example, the State of Utah owns the physical assets of
Central Waterworks, thus indicating a special relationship
between the defendants.

Moreover, state ownership of physical

assets used by a private party carries with it the obligation of insuring that the state's property is administered
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in a nondiscriminatory fashion.

Burton v. Wilmington Parking

Authority, 365 U.S. at 725, 6 L.Ed.2d at 52.
The issue of state action is also discussed in Janusaitis
v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 607 F.2d 17 (2d

Cir.

1979), where the level and kind of State involvement are
similar to the instant case.

In Janusaitis, a former member

of a town's volunteer fire department brought a civil rights
action against the fire department chief and members of the
department's executive committee, alleging that his suspension
and dismissal violated constitutional guarantees of free
speech and due process.

The district court dismissed the

complaint, holding that there was no state action; moreover,
even if there was state action, dismissal of the fireman
did not violate First Amendment guarantees.

Janusaitis v.

Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 464 F. Supp. 288 (D.C.
Conn. 1979).

Upon appeal, the Secon9 Circuit affirmed the

district court on the latter ground; however, the Court of
Appeals held that the actions of the volunteer fire department
in dismissing the fireman constituted state action and could
offend the First Amendment.
The Second Circuit relied upon Holodnak and Burton in
finding the presence of a "symbiotic relationship" between
the Town of Middlebury and the volunteer fire department.
The fire department used land, buildings and fire fighting
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equipment owned by the town; moreover, the town had a distinct
interest in providing protection from fires.

Likewise, Cen-

tral Waterworks' assets, including water rights, are owned
by the State of Utah.

In addition, the Department of Water

Resources has a statutory mandate to insure the conservation
and efficient use of the State's water supply.
State action is present when the sifting of facts and
weighing of circumstances reveals a special relationship
between the State and a private party.

In the instant case,

the Department of Water Resources and Central Waterworks
have combined their efforts to promote the efficient use of
Utah's water resources.

While Central may have purely sel-

fish interests at heart, the State's involvement comes only
at the direction of the legislature to finance and take title
to water projects which put the State-owned resource to its
highest beneficial use.

See Utah Cope Ann. §73-10-1 (7) (1953),

Since the State owns all waters of the State, Utah Code Ann.
§73-1-1 (1953), subject to beneficial use, Utah Code Ann.
§73-1-3( 1953), the State benefits directly by financing projects which conserve the resource.

The interests and acts

of the State and Central are so "intertwined that the State
must be recognized as 'a joint participant in the challe~~
activity.

' Burton, supra, 365 U.S. at 725, 6 L.Ed.2d

at 52, 81 S.Ct. at 862."

Janusaitis, supra, 607 F.2d at 23.

-8-
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since a symbiotic relationship is present, the State
and Central Waterworks are required to administer the water
system in conformance with the Constitutions of the State
cf Utah and the United States.

B.

State Action Is Present in Central
Waterworks' Performance of a Traditionally Governmental Function.

The Articles of Incorporation of Central Waterworks
Company state that one of the purposes for which the corporation was organized was the "distribution of water to the
inhabitants and citizens of the Town'of Central, Sevier County,
State of Utah, and users nearby or within a short distance of
said town."

(R. p. 55).

The distribution of water is tradi-

tionally a governmental function; however, in some cases,
areas without appropriate subdivisions of government may rely
upon private corporations for their water.

While the entity

providing water service may be a private corporation or person; nevertheless, the service provided remains traditionally
governmental in character.

This is particularly the case

where the private entity is, at least fiscally, a creature of
the state.
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S.
345, 352, 42 L.Ed.2d 477, 485, 95

s.ct.

449, 454 (1974), the

court recognized that there could be "state action present
in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally
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exclusively reserved to the state.°
~Alabama,

For example,

in~

326 u.s. 501, 90 L.Ed. 265, 66 s.ct. 275 (1946),

the Supreme Court held that a Jehovah's Witness could not be
prosecuted by the state for trespassing while distributing
religious literature on the streets of a company town.

The

company town in Marsh had all the attributes of a municipality, with the exception that title to the property was
vested in a private corporation.

The court, noting that the

state should not permit a corporation to govern a community
of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties,
held that the more a private party resembles and acts like a
governmental entity, the more likely an inference of state
action will be drawn.

In short, Marsh held that a private

party could be subject to constitutional restrictions in the
exercise of traditionally governmental activities.
Here, Central Waterworks has developed a monopoly on
the delivery of water in the area.

Furthermore, Central,

with the encouragement and blessing of the State Department
of Water Resources, has defended its exclusivity by protesting a well application by plaintiffs on their property.
Finally, Central Waterworks has imposed a thinly veiled zoning
regulation under its "one connection one acre 0 rule.

Under

the rule of Marsh, Central Waterworks has effectively abandoned its claim to immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment.

-10-
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see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 15 L.Ed.2d 373, 86

s.ct.

486 (1966).
In Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department,

~~a,

the Second Circuit held that fire protection is a

governmental activity and subject to constitutional limitations.

Consequently, the actions of the volunteer fire depart-

ment in dismissing the fireman could offend the First Amendment even though the municipality took no active part in
the dismissal.

In short, it is well established that the

acts of a private entity may be state action solely because
of the business or activity which the private entity pursues.
POINT II
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED AGAINST CENTRAL
WATERWORKS FOR VIOLATIONS OF APPELLANTS'
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
As previously noted, the categorization of Central Waterworks as a "private" corporation does not insulate the company from the Constitution.

In addition, the word "private"

does not prevent the court from granting appropriate relief
to the appellants.

Where a finding of state action is made,

it is clearly appropriate for remedial measures to be directed
toward the private party as well as the state.
Wilmington Parking Authority, supra.

Burton v.

Otherwise, "the diffi-

culty of separating private from governmental action for
remedial purposes would often preclude any effective relief."
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Holodnak v. Avco Corporation, 514 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir.
1975).
The Second Circuit also noted in Holodnak, that:
It goes without saying, where a nominally
private party has been allow~d to exercise
powers traditionally reserved to the government itself, it will no longer be treated for
remedial purposes as a 'private party.'
See,
~,Marsh v. Alabama, 327 U.S. 501, 66 ~Ct.
276, 90 L. Ed. 265 ( 1946) (company town);
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 86 s. Ct. 486,
15 L. Ed.2d 373 (1966)(municipal park).
Holodnak, supra, at 292 n. 7.

In short, relief may be granted

to the appellants against both Central Waterworks and the
State of Utah regardless of which version of state action,
or combination thereof, is found to exist.

Regardless of

whether state action stems from a symbiotic relationship
between Central Waterworks and the State of Utah or from
the fact that Central Waterworks performs a traditionally
governmental function, the court may require that the assets
of Central Waterworks be administered with due regard to
appellants' constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
Central Waterworks' denial of water connections to the
appellants is State action within the purview and protection
of either the Utah or United States Constitutions.

The syr

biotic relationship between the respondents, characterized
by the mutual benefits conferred by the venture and State
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ownership of Central's assets, gives rise to state action
in the arbitrary and capricious acts of Central.

Further-

more, Central, in performance of a traditionally governmental
fur.ct ion, has shed the cloak of immunity normally retained
by a private entity.

Finally, the Court may grant appellants

relief as against both respondents, even though Central is
nominally a private entity.
In view of the fact that the apppellants have stated a
cause of action upon which relief may be granted, the judgments of the lower court should be reversed and the matter
remanded to the District Court.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

~a.~
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